Opinion Transhipment facility shutdown: Bangladesh has forgotten that India has less to lose

This “sphere of influence” idea as a doctrine of belief and action has little merit. However, it is a reality across the globe. The popularity of terms such as “America’s backyard” and “near abroad” in America and Russia respectively points to the predominance of the orthopraxy of “sphere of influence”. It is not a hegemonic notion in international relations theory but a hegemonic practice as evidenced in the concrete actions of regional hegemons across the world.

Ukraine, Mongolia, Taiwan, Cuba and Bangladesh are all subjected to it differently. Nigeria and South Africa have their spheres of influence in Africa. Bangladesh, however, is in a peculiar position of being possibly under two or three spheres of influence. Under the Hasina regime, India was accepted as the regional hegemon, and others were engaged only in a way that did not hurt India.

Dhaka’s new foreign policy may not be anti-Indian as many Indians fear, but it is not Indo-centric either. Understanding this change helps unravel some of its motivations and messaging. It was Bangladesh that sought meetings with the Indian government. The press wing of the Chief Advisor also put out a positive account of the meeting with Modi. But Bangladesh seeks to bargain with its other two possible big-brother allies — China and the US. Yunus was all too willing to cooperate with Trump’s new tariff regime, and to invite Chinese investment in Bangladesh.

However, its bargains with India have a curious lacuna: There is no offer, only a demand that India extradite Sheikh Hasina. Bangladesh’s interim government and civil society have repeated this demand over the past months and ossified it into a rite of passage that would make further negotiations with India permissible. Settling the Hasina affair is seen by the new regime as a way for India to reclaim its respect in Bangladeshi society.

There are two problems with Bangladesh’s position, which it seems unwilling to reckon with. Firstly, it cannot expect India to compromise its civilisational integrity so easily and give up a respectable leader to what would possibly be a mob trial and mock justice.

Secondly, Bangladesh has somehow forgotten that India has less to lose from not being on its side than vice versa. Slow-motion punishment is a realistic strategy for India while dealing with Bangladesh’s overreaches. As a dominant power in South Asia, it can weather a standoff with much less damage.

China’s weight as India’s rival is ostensibly fuelling Bangladesh’s confidence. This is in itself contradictory to Bangladesh’s “aspiration for a return to democracy”, which Reaz Ahmed, acting editor of the Dhaka Tribune, asked India to recognise. China’s ruling regime is known to be authoritarian in domestic affairs and authoritarian-pragmatic in foreign policy. How can Bangladesh with its new democratic spirit align with a non-democratic country?

Bangladesh might be in for a bargaining game, but it ought to know this does not bode well — not for India, which it need not consider, but for itself. It need not put itself in the position of Cuba, which threw itself against the US at the USSR’s behest and only ended up as an isolated swamp amidst a flourishing oasis.

Bangladesh is also threatened by climate change. Extreme weather events and changes in climate patterns are projected to profoundly affect agriculture and immigration patterns. In the long run, Bangladesh will have no option other than relying on India for disaster mitigation and rehabilitation. Unlike some of the other climate-sensitive regions, Bangladesh is one of the most densely populated states in the world. A disastrous climate event would also create an uncontrolled influx of refugees into India and other South Asian countries, destabilising the fragile social balance.

There is a need for a realistic and pragmatic foreign policy for Bangladesh, for its own good. Right now, it is playing a utopian game. Its long-term interests are better served if it recognises the regional realities in South Asia. As a quintessentially South Asian country in terms of culture, politics, religion, and geography, both its strengths and weaknesses demand that it ally with a regionally integrated South Asian future.

A democratic Bangladesh and a democratic India, despite the limitations of democracy in both countries, can come together to create a South Asian Century. Bangladesh already led the efforts for the creation of SAARC and now chairs BIMSTEC. Its future is invariably tied to the South Asian future as much as India’s; this consideration ought to make it drop its demanding behaviour towards India and shift towards cooperation.

Kuriakose Mathew teaches politics and international relations at the School of Liberal Arts and Management Studies, P P Savani University, Surat. His research focuses on democratic forces in transitional polities. Arjun Ramachandran is a research scholar at the Department of Communication, University of Hyderabad.